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I. INTRODUCTION
Following the breakup of the Soviet Union and resulting decline in fear of
nuclear war, attention has shifted to other threats that remained in the
background during the superpower confrontation. Fear of biological warfare
uniquely fits the new evolving world. International instability characterizes the
post-Cold War world. Additionally, the demise of the Soviet Union created a
vacuum in American policy perceptions. With no great power threat, American
attention has focused on rogue states and international terrorist organizations.
Furthermore, unlike nuclear weapons, biological weapons are relatively
inexpensive and easy to conceal. States unable to afford an atomic weapons
program can still develop this "poor man's atom bomb." Non-state actors such
as international terrorist organizations, domestic hate groups, and millennial
cults can procure ingredients necessary to create homemade biological
weapons. With Boris Yeltsin's 1992 revelation of the existence of a Soviet
offensive biological weapons program in the 1970s and 1980s, and the 1995
Tokyo subway sarin nerve gas attack, concerns increased over the threat of
biological war.
* The author is a 1999 graduate of the University of Tulsa College of Law and Graduate School.
He earned a Juris Doctorate Degree as well as a Master of Arts Degree in History from the University of Tulsa
where he concentrated on international law and diplomatic history. He earned his Bachelor of Arts Degree
in History from Central Missouri State University in 1995. He is presently a member of the Virginia State
Bar and resides in Falls Church, Virginia.
1. Joshua Lederberg, Foreward, in STRENGTHENING THE BiOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION:
KEY POINTS FORTHE FOURTH REviEW CONFERENCE 1 (Graham S. Pearson & Malcolm R. Dando, ed., 1996)
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Faced with the growing risk posed by these weapons of mass destruction,
various proposals have emerged to counter biological warfare. Debate focuses
on the relative cost and value of preventive measures. These measures range
from increased criminalization of acts preceding the use of biological weapons
to curative measures such as biological disaster training for first response
medical personnel and stockpiling of antibiotics. Due to the high cost of
curative measures and the uncertainty of their efficacy, some commentators
liken these measures to the 1950s movement to provide bomb shelters as a
solution to the menace of nuclear war.2 The alternative to developing curative
measures requires strengthening of international norms regarding the
development and use of biological weapons.
The United States has led an initiative to strengthen the Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972 through creation
of a Protocol The proposed Protocol, slated for completion by the end of
1998, would create stronger mechanisms to monitor state enforcement of
existing treaty obligations.4 The new Protocol may eventually borrow
verification and inspection features from those contained in the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC).5
However, the BWC intentionally lacked specific provisions for
verification and inspection in its initial form. Differences in the history of
chemical and biological warfare and in the development, production and
deployment of the two types of weapons may have led to the evolution of
different legal norms. For any BWC Protocol to prove effective, measures
should specifically counter biological weapons programs, not merely echo
general international verification and inspection standards contained in other
weapons control regimes.
This paper will analyze the prospects for successful strengthening of the
biological weapons control regime. The first section of this paper will explain
in The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) Database, (visited Oct. 1, 1999) <
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/key4rev/forward.html >. See also, Robert P. Kadlec et al., Biological
Weapons Control: Prospects and Implications for the Future, 278 JAMA 351,351 (1997).
2. Ehud Sprinzak, The Great Superterrorism Scare, FOREIGN POL'Y, (1998), at 110, 122-23.
3. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583,
[hereinafter Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention].
4. John D. Holum, Remarks to the Fourth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons
Convention (visited Oct. 1, 1999) <http'/www.acdagov/speeches/holum/bwcrev.htm>. See also President
William Clinton, Remarks at the United States Naval Academy Commencement (May 22, 1998) (visited
Oct.23, 1999) <http:l/www.usia.govltopical/pollterror/98052201.htm>.
5. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, S. TREATY DOc. No. 21,103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993), [hereinafter Chemical Weapons Convention].
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the current international threat of biological warfare, detailing the types of
biological weapons that pose a threat and the possible users of these weapons.
The second section will trace the history of biological warfare. Next, the paper
will outline early developments of international law to meet the threat of
biological warfare and then detail the current international legal standard
contained in the BWC. After describing the existing biological weapons
control regime, this paper will examine the ongoing debate concerning stricter
international standards and will analyze elements required to strengthen the
BWC. This debate generally concerns equitable North-South power
distribution within the international community, as well as potentially invasive
verification procedures. The development of international law since entry into
force of the BWC will provide a backdrop to the current drafting of the BWC
Protocol. This paper will then examine the proposed Protocol and the legal
standard currently being negotiated. The development of international law of
war reflects the interplay of technology, conflicting national interests and moral
standards. In order to succeed in influencing behavior, legal norms must
address these factors.
II. THE CURRENT THREAT OF BIOLOGICAL WAR
The current threat of biological warfare is twofold. State use of biological
weapons is the first threat. Use of weapons by non-state actors, including
international terrorist organizations, constitutes the second threat of biological
warfare. Each threat requires distinct counter-measures. A millennial cult like
Aum Shinrikyo, already anticipating an apocalypse, might not be dissuaded,6
while a state may respond to the counter-threat of massive retaliation. In
addition, in order to punish an international terrorist organization by linking it
to a state, a government must accumulate proof, which is time consuming and
often inconclusive.7
6. Richard Danzig & Pamela B. Berkowsky, Why Should We Be Concerned About Biological
Warfare?, 278 JAMA 431, 431 (1997). See also Robert P. Kadlec, supra note 1, at 355. Aum Shinrikyo,
a Japanese cult intent on bringing the end of the world, developed chemical weapons like those it used in a
crowded Tokyo subway as well as anthrax and botulism toxin for mass attacks on civilians to cause chaos.
Id. at 354.
7. Id. See also George W. Christopher, Biological Warfare: A Historical Perspective, 278 JAMA
412, 416 (1997). In addition to the problem of proof required to connect an act of biological terrorism to a
state actor, the interval of time may create difficulties for retaliatory action by reducing the legal justification
of self-defense. The international standard for self-defense was recognized by Great Britain and the United
States following a British attack on an American vessel, the "Caroline," Destruction of the "Caroline,"
MOORE, 2 A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 409-414, in BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1293 (2d ed. 1995). The Caroline dictum states the international standard of self-
defense: "[W]hile it is admitted that exceptions growing out of the great law of self-defense do exist, those
exceptions should be confined to cases in which the 'necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming,
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In addition to a distinction between possible weapons users, distinctions
exist among the weapons potential of biological agents. An army might employ
biological weapons for battlefield use against an enemy army or against a large
civilian population. The slow, uncontrollable nature of some biological
weapons limits potential battlefield use, creating an uncertainty regarding
possible infection and the length of time required to debilitate an army.' The
types of biological agents vary in lethality, incubation period, and in the ability
to spread.' Possible agents include viruses such as ebola, marburg, yellow
fever, equine morbillivirus, and bacteria such as anthracis, brucella, clostridium
botulinum, francisella tularensis and yersinia pestis, as well as rickettsiae, fungi
and toxins derived from biological agents.' ° Some diseases caused by
and leaving no means, and no moment for deliberation."' Id. The passage of time between the act of
terrorism and collection of sufficient proof may be great enough to negate the necessity to respond with force
in self-defense. The alternative to self-defense, the doctrine of reprisals, would be limited to acts directed
against the military since international law outlaws reprisals against civilian populations, thereby prohibiting
massive retaliation. Protocol Additional (No. I) to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art. 51(6), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. See
generally, PAUL CHRISTOPHER, THE ETHICS OF WAR AND PEACE: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL AND MORAL
IssuEs 189-200 (1994). But see, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 l.C.J. 95 (July 8),
92-97 (visited Nov. 2, 1998) <http://www.law.comell.edu/ic/icjl/unan5afin.htm>. Despite the inability
to distinguish between civilians and combatants as well as between neutrals and hostile parties when using
comparable weapons of mass destruction, "the Court is led to observe that it cannot reach a definitive
conclusion as to the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear weapons by a State in an extreme circumstance
of self-defense, in which its very survival would be at stake." Id. at 97.
8. John D. Steinbruner, Biological Weapons: A Plague Upon All Houses, 109 FOREIGN POL'Y,
85, 87-88 (1997-98). An important distinction between biological weapons and other weapons is that
biological agents are alive, increasing the difficulty of controlling them. Id. at 87. See also Danzig, supra
note 6, at 43 1.
9. David R. Franz, Clinical Recognition and Management of Patients Exposed to Biological
Warfare Agents, 278 JAMA 399, (1997). For instance, while anthrax is very deadly, it is not spread by
person to person contact. The only known instance of person to person spread of anthrax occurred after two
people shared a loofa sponge. Meryl Nass, Biological Warfare, 352 LANCET 491 (1998) available in LEXIS,
Genmed Library, Alljnl File. However, the durability of anthrax after delivered to a battlefield could allow
it to be used in a similar manner to landmines. Id.
10. See James R. Ferguson, Biological Weapons and US. Law, 278 JAMA 357,359(1997). The
effects of these agents differ greatly. Many symptoms result from the inhalation of biological agents. See
generally, Franz, supra note 9. Anthrax has an incubation period of one to five days after being inhaled,
followed by fever, malaise and severe respiratory distress and death resulting in several days. Id. at 401.
Brucellosis has an incubation period of five to sixty days, followed by the spread of parasites in organs such
as the spleen, liver, or central nervous symptom, causing varied symptoms, yet the disease is usually not fatal.
Id. at 402. Plague has an incubation period of two to three days, and is followed by acute pneumonia
progressing rapidly to respiratory failure, shock, and death. Id. Smallpox has an incubation period of seven
to seventeen days, followed by spread from the respiratory tract to lymph nodes, and causes an onset of pox
lesions, fever, vomiting, and occasionally delirium; death resulting among 3% of treated and 30% of untreated
patients. Id. at 404. Botulinum toxins have an incubation period of one to five days, followed by palsies,
blurred vision, skeletal muscle paralysis, respiratory failure, and often death. Id. at 407-08. Botulinum toxins
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biological agents such as staphylococcal enterotoxin B have an incubation
period of only one to six hours, while others like brucellosis and Q fever may
take over a month to develop."
Several devices, including bombs, missiles, and aerosols, may deliver
biological agents. An examination of Iraqi delivery systems shows
development of 250-400 pound bombs capable of carrying sixty to eighty-five
liters of botulinum toxin, anthrax or aflatoxin.' By 1990, Iraq had prepared
approximately 150 of these weapons. 3 Iraq also armed twenty-five SCUD
missiles with biological agents prior to the Gulf War of 1991.'4 However,
exploding warheads ineffectively deliver biological agents as explosion
generally does not deliver the aerosolized particles more than several meters
and can infect few people. 5
Aerosol delivery systems deliver biological agents more effectively, by
delivering biological agents to a wider area, and by delivering biological agents
in smaller particles more capable of being carried by the wind. 6 The aerosol
weapons' drawbacks include the need for sophisticated airplanes with dispersal
systems, air superiority over the target, as well as accurate meteorology to
determine favorable wind and weather conditions." Terrorists.could attack
using crop dusting aircraft or trucks equipped with spray tanks, by placing
aerosol canisters in air-conditioning systems of major buildings, or by directly
contaminating bulk food supplies.'
The United States believes several nations are developing offensive
biological warfare programs similar to that developed by Iraq before the 1991
are the most toxic compounds known to man, 100,000 times more toxic than sarin by weight. Id. at 407.
Patients that survive from botulism toxin usually do not develop resistance due to the very small amount of
toxin needed to cause symptoms. Id. at 408. Staphylococcal enterotoxin B causes fever, headache, chills,
and myalgia after an incubation period of one to six hours, but is seldom fatal and patients can return to their
normal routines after one to two weeks. Id. at 408-09. Q fever has an incubation period often to forty days,
and is followed by various symptoms including fever, chills, headache, and weight loss, but is rarely fatal.
Id. at 403.
11. Franz, supra note 9, at 400-01.
12. Raymond A. Zilinskas,lraq 'sBiological Weapons: The Past as Future?, 278 JAMA 418,420
(1997). Interestingly, while being easy to produce, aflatoxin has no known biological weapon value and may
have been produced by Iraqi scientists for long-term carcinogenic value or merely in order to meet production
quotas for biological agents. Id. at 421.
13. Id
14. Id. In the Persian Gulf War, Iraq launched 39 SCUD missiles at Israel, but none were armed
with biological warheads. Id. at 421.
15. Zilinskas, supra note 12, at 421.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 421.
18. Jeffrey D. Simon, Biological Terrorism: Preparing to Meet the Threat, 278 JAMA 428,429
(1997).
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Gulf War. The West doubted Russian compliance with the BWC following
Russian revelations in 1992 of prior violations of the BWC despite being a
signatory and one of three depository states of the BWC. 19 These doubts
increased with the decline in the Russian economy, raising questions about the
government's ability to pay personnel, thus preventing them from selling their
services to the highest bidder.20 Despite the presence of United Nation's
inspectors, Iraq could still revitalize its biological weapons program on short
notice.2 In addition, the United States suspects China, Syria, Iran, Egypt, Libya
and Taiwan of developing some biological weapons program.22 Besides these
countries, India, Pakistan and North Korea either have the domestic
biotechnology industry capable of developing biological weapons or could
develop them within the next ten years.23 The United States currently believes
the threat of a state sponsored biological terrorist attack is low; although, the
possibility of non-state extremist groups, similar to the Japanese Aum
Shinrikyo, acquiring weapons of mass destruction is greater.24 Ironically,
American superiority in conventional weapons may lead poorer nations and
non-state actors to develop biological weapons as a means of redressing the
imbalance.25
III. HISTORY OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
The use of biological weapons in war extends back to the beginning of
history, before modem understanding of the weapons. Early uses revolved
around the spread of infection from corpses, animal carcasses, and filth as well
as the use of biotoxins. 26 The ancient Athenians used biological warfare as
19. 1997 ANNUAL REPORT: ADHERENCE TOAND COMPLIANCE w1THARMS CONTROLAGREEMENTS
9 (visited Oct. 1, 1999) <http://www.acda.gov/reports/arnual/comp97.htm>.
20. Id.
21. Id. See also Zilinskas, supra note 12, at 422-23.
22. 1997 ANNUALREPORT: ADHERENCE TOAND COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS,
supra note 19, at 10-11. It is interesting to note that accusations of violations of the BWC are not always
made by the United States against rogue states: In June of 1997, Cuba alleged that the United States violated
the BWC by dispensing a crop-destroying insect over Cuba, leading to formal and informal consultations.
Id.
23. See generally, PROLIFERATION: THREAT AND RESPONSE 1997 1 (visited Oct. 23, 1999)
<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97.html>.
24. PROLIFERATION: THREAT AND RESPONSE 1997 1 (visited Oct. 1, 1999) <http://www.
defenselink.milpubs/prolii97/trans.html>.
25. Message of the Secretary of Defense, PROLIFERATION: THREAT AND RESPONSE 1997 1 (visited
Oct. 23, 1999) <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/message.html>.
26. George W. Christopher, supra note 7, at 412. Often armies placed carcasses in wells and other
water sources to prevent the use of water supply by enemy armies and civilians during extended sieges or
campaigns. Id.
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early as 600 BC, contaminating a stream with "helleborous roots," a poisonous
type of lily root, causing illness when the opposing city drank the water.27
Hannibal catapulted pots containing poisonous snakes against enemy ships, and
Carthaginian generals poisoned wine before retreating to debilitate advancing
foes who then looted the camp and drank the wine.28
Disastrous use of biological weapons occurred in the early and middle
modem ages, when armies released highly infectious diseases without hope of
containment. In the 1346 siege of Caffa, on the coast of the Crimea, a besieging
Mongol army catapulted corpses infected with plague into the city.29 As the
city fell and the citizens fled to Italy, they carried the plague throughout Europe,
eventually killing one quarter of Europe's population.30 In 1763, British troops
traded smallpox infected blankets to Native Americans under the orders, "[y]ou
will do well to try to inoculate the Indians by means of the blankets, as well as
to try every other method that can serve to extirpate this execrable race.
Apparently, the blankets proved effective, as smallpox epidemics hit Mingoe,
Delaware and Shawanoe tribes the following year.32
There have been other less sophisticated uses of biological warfare in
recent history. In the American Civil War, retreating Confederate forces drove
farm animals into ponds and shot them to contaminate water supplies an
advancing army would use.33 In the Vietnam War, Viet Cong troops smeared
feces on pungi sticks in the early 1960s to infect any unwary soldier who
stepped on a stick.34 Many states make claims of "poisoning the well" in the
course of conflicts.33
Highly sophisticated uses of biological weapons are new to this century.
In the First World War, Germany used anthrax and glanders, an infectious horse
bacterium, to infect livestock of Allied and neutral nations.36 German agents
27. PAUL CHRISTOPHER, supra note 7, at 202.
28. Id. at 202-03.
29. Id. at.204.
30. Steinbruner, supra note 8, at 86. See also George W. Christopher, supra note 7, at 412. This
account of the use of infected corpses may oversimplify the spread of the plague in Europe, as other carriers
may have been at work. Id.
31. FRANCIS PARKMAN, THE CONSPIRACY OF PONTIAC 648 (1991), cited in PAUL CHRISTOPHER,
supra note 7, at 204.
32. PAUL CHRISTOPHER, supra note 7, at 204. Again, other contacts between Native Americans
and settlers may have also spread the disease, and the blankets would have proved inefficient sources of
contagion. George W. Christopher, supra note 7, at 412.
33. PAUL CHRISTOPHER, supra note 7, at 205.
34. George W. Christopher, supra note 7, at 412.
35. See generally, I. Milek, Biological Weapons, in CBW: CHEMICALAND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
48, 48-49 (Steven Rose ed., 1968).
36. George W. Christopher, supra note 7, at 413.
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targeted Romania, Argentina and United States livestock to prevent their sale
to the Allies, as well as French cavalry horses and mules in the Mesopotamian
theater of war." Unlike other instances of biological warfare, German use in
the First World War targeted animals, not humans.
Between the World Wars, various nations conducted experiments with
biological weapons, including Belgium, Canada, France, Great Britain, Italy,
the Netherlands, Poland and the Soviet Union.3 Japanese military went the
next step during the Second World War, developing and using modem
biological weapons against Chinese civilians.39 Japan centered its biological
weapons research in Unit 731, developing plague, cholera and typhoid agents,
and experimenting on prisoners of war and Chinese civilians.4' The Japanese
prepared several devices for delivering biological agents, including a bacterial
bomb, a defoliation bacilli bomb, weather balloons able to cross the Pacific, and
submarine launched weapons.4' Japan also developed plans for germ-infected
suicide troops to rush out among advancing American troops, spreading
contagion.42
The Allies also conducted experiments with offensive biological weapons
during the Second World War, although no deployment of the weapons
occurred. Great Britain tested anthrax on sheep on the Scottish island of
Gruinard.43  The United States experimented with biological weapons for
possible use against Japanese troops, civilians, and crops." The United States
37. Id.
38. Id
39. PAUL CHRISTOPHER, supra note 7, at 205. The Japanese attacks apparently had mixed success:
An attack on China in 1941 caused 10,000 casualties among Japanese troops, including 1,700 deaths from
cholera, George W. Christopher, supra note 7, at 413. Recently Chinese survivors of Japanese biological
warfare attacks have brought suit against the Japanese government in a Japanese court, claiming bubonic
plague killed as many as 94,000 people between 1937 and 1945. Jonathan Watts, Japan Taken to Court Over
Germ Warfare Allegations, 351 LANCET 657 (1998) available in LEXIS, Genmed Library, Alljnl File.
40. THOMAS B. ALLEN & NORMAN POLMARt, CODE-NAME DOWNFALL: THE SECRET PLAN TO
INVADE JAPAN-AND WHY TRUMAN DROPPED THE BOMB 185-87 (1995).
41. Id. at 187-89,257. The Japanese had planned on carrying out attacks, successfully sending test
balloons as far as South Dakota and setting a tentative target date of September 22, 1945, for submarine
launched biological agents. Id.
42. Id. at 256-57.
43. Robin Clarke & J. Perry Robinson, Research Policy: United Kingdom, in CBW: CHEMICAL
AND BIOLOGICAL WAIRFARE 105, 108-09 (Steven Rose ed., 1968). British experiments also highlighted the
dangers of the biological agents: as the anthracis bacillus is very stable and may remain dormant for up to
one hundred years, the island of Grninard was uninhabitable following the experiments. Id. British efforts
to decontaminate the islands with formaldehyde and seawater only occurred in 1986. Christopher, supra note
7, at 413. The danger that would result after widespread use of anthrax in war would dwarf the landmine
problem, as contagion could potentially remain decades after the end of a conflicL
44. ALLEN, supra note 40, at 178-83. The United States planned production of anthrax bombs at
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did not rule out the first-use of chemical weapons, and there is little reason to
believe moral compulsion would prevent American use of biological weapons.45
During the 1944 Normandy invasion, the American army provided its troops
with antidotes to potential German biological weapons.46
Since the Second World War, the United States' position has evolved from
experimenting with biological weapons to rejecting them. By the time the
United States renounced the use of biological weapons in 1969, the American
military had developed numerous biological agents for use in war, including the
highly lethal anthrax and botulism.47 Throughout this period, the United States
conducted secret experiments on American cities to test the spread of
aerosolized particles." Although the Soviet Union and several communist
nations leveled accusations of biological warfare against the United States, the
charges were unsubstantiated.49
By 1969, the American military recognized both the limited battlefield
value of biological weapons, and the potential for other nations to use these
weapons for purposes of mass destruction. 0 By ending development of
biological weapons and forbidding their use even in retaliation of biological
warfare, the United States helped to develop an international standard against
any use of biological weapons. The outlawing of biological warfare would
preserve the American strategic position as a nuclear power, as cheaper, easy
to build biological weapons could give poorer nations a leveler to the nuclear
bomb.5
Russia did not hold the same opinion of biological weapons as the United
States and continued to develop biological weapons for both battlefield and
the rate of 500,000 per month, and experimented with biotoxins to be used on Japanese rice, cereal, and sweet
potato crops. Id.
45. Id. at 177-78.
46. Id at 181-82. Hitler reportedly forbid the development of biological weapons, but research
was conducted by the Germans, including testing on prisoners in concentration camps. George W.
Christopher, supra note 7, at 413.
47. George W. Christopher, supra note 7, at 414. In addition, the Central Intelligence Agency had
prepared its own biotoxin weapons, including a stockpile of cobra venom, possibly for use as an assassination
weapon. Id
48. LEONARD A. COLE, THE ELEVENTH PLAGuE: THE POLMCS OF BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL
WARFARE 18 (1997). The Pentagon admitted conducting general tests between 1949 and 1968 over San
Francisco, Minneapolis, St. Louis, Key West, and Panama City, Florida, as well as conducting more focused
experiments in the New York City subway, the Washington, D.C. National Airport, and the Pennsylvania
Turnpike. Id. Simulants designed to replicate the spread of biological agents were delivered by aerosol
dispersal. George W. Christopher, supra note 7, at 414. The covert experiments in San Francisco resulted
in an outbreak of urinary tract infections at Stanford University Hospital, causing one death. Id.
49. George W. Christopher, supra note 7, at 415.
50. Steinbruner, supra note 8, at 89.
51. George W. Christopher, supra note 7, at 415-16.
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strategic use.52 Russia admitted in 1992 to continuing an offensive biological
weapons program, even following ratification of the BWC.53 The 19.79 anthrax
outbreak near a Soviet facility in Sverdlovsk provided an early indication of a
continued Soviet biological weapons program.54 No confirmation of Russian
battlefield use of biological weapons exists, but Russia did develop biotoxins
as assassination weapons.55
South Africa also developed biological agents as assassination weapons
before ratifying the BWC.16  The South African Truth and Reconciliation
52. Steinbruner, supra note 8, at 89. Strategic use of weapons refers to the non-battlefield actions
designed to eliminate a nation's ability to wage war, such as the destruction of factories necessary for
producing weapons.
53. See Joint U.SU.Ki.Russian Statement on Biological Weapons, Sep. 14, 1992, in Biological
Weapons, I (visited Oct. 23, 1999) <http://www.acda.gov/factsheelwmd/bw/joint.hm>. Russia agreed to
dismantle its weapons program, although the program is believed to employ 25,000 to 30,000 technicians,
down from a high level of 55,000. George W. Christopher, supra note 7, at 416. Suspicion over Russian
intentions remain even today, despite greater transparency within Russia. See Frontline: Plague War:
Interviews: William S. Cohen, 5-7 (visited Oct. 13, 1999) <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ pages/fron...shows/
plaguedinterviews/cohen.html>. The United States government believes that despite good intentions of
Russian President Boris Yeltsin, political factors in Russia prevent the total dismantling of the biological
weapons program. Id.
54. George W. Christopher, supra note 7, at 416. The outbreak was believed to be responsible for
64 deaths over a six week period. Frontline: Plague War: The 1979 Anthrax Leak, I (visited Oct. 13, 1999)
<http:/lwww.pbs.orglwgbhlpageslfrontline/showslplaguesverdlovsk>. Dr. Kanatjan Alibekov, former
Deputy Director of Biopreparat, the Soviet biological weapons program, stated that the accident resulted
from the failure to replace an exhaust filter at the facility, and that if the wind had been blowing in the other
direction, toward Sverdlovsk, the death toll could have been as high as hundreds of thousands. Dr. Kanatjan
Alibekov, Frontline: Plague War: The 1979Anthrax Leak: 1 (visited Oct. 13, 1999) <http://www.pbs.org
wgbh/pages/fron...ws/plaguelsverdlovsklalibekov.html>.
55. George W. Christopher, supra note 7, at 416. The Bulgarian secret service assassinated Georgi
Markov, a Bulgarian emigrd living in London, stabbing him with an umbrella infected with ricin. Jeffrey D.
Simon, supra note 18, at 429. Certain easily developed biological agents, like ricin, are more effective for
individual attacks than mass attacks, as they have little infectious qualities. Id. Iraq easily developed ricin
in the late 1980s and early 1990s as it is a naturally occurring toxin from the castor bean plant. Zilinskas,
supra note 12, at 419-20.
56. Frontline: Plague War: What Happened in South Africa?, I (visited Nov. 1, 1998)
<http'J/www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plaguesa/>. Interestingly, the managing director ofa South
African biological weapons facility asserted that the siege mentality of the apartheid government in South
Africa created conditions where researchers felt justified in developing weapons. Dr. Daan Goosen,
Frontline: Plague War: Interviews: 6-7 (visited Nov. 1, 1998) <http://www.pbs.orgwgbh/pages/frontline
shows/plague/sa/goosen.html>. Similar justifications could be made by other isolated and threatened
regimes, such as Sadam Hussein's Iraq. Even after considering the ethical ramifications ofbiological warfare,
South African developers reached the conclusion that "It]here isn't much of a difference if you use a gun to
kill someone or if you use a more refined product to do that." Id. at 2. Francisco de Vitoria described a
situation known as "invincible ignorance" in which a party to a dispute is not capable of discerning the
objective morality of his position and assumes his position to be just. See PAUL CHRISTOPHER, supra note
7, at 62-63. Soldiers are presumed to be shielded from the guilt of an unjust war by invincible ignorance, but
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Commission is currently investigating allegations relating to past biological
weapons programs that may have included development of weapons used in the
Rhodesian civil war in the late 1970s." Except for possible intervention into
the Rhodesian civil war, South Africa designed its weapons program against its
own population to secure white minority rule. The South African program
apparently targeted black political leaders and may have included infertility
toxins aimed at reducing the black population.58
In the recent Persian Gulf War, Iraq deployed anthrax, but did not use it
in battle.59 Although Iraq possessed SCUD missiles armed with biological
agents, they did not arm any of the thirty-nine SCUD missiles fired on Israeli
cities during the war with biological weapons." The use of weapons of mass
destruction in the conflict would probably have triggered a response with
nuclear weapons by the United States. 61 The United States currently applies
deterrence, the Cold War policy used to prevent nuclear war, against potential
biological warfare aggressors, which possibly influenced Iraqi behavior during
the 1991 Persian Gulf War.
an issue arises to what extent a scientist or doctor may be shielded from guilt for participating in an unjust
war such as one to sustain an apartheid government. Id.
57. Frontline: Plague War: What Happened in South Africa?, supra note 56, at 1. The world's
largest outbreak of anthrax occurred in Rhodesia in 1979, with 82 people killed and thousands infected. Id.
Dr. Timothy Stamps, Zimbabwe Minister of Health is currently investigating the use of biological weapons
in the civil war of the former Rhodesia, noting annual occurrence of around two dozen cases of anthrax over
two decades, followed by 10,000 cases in 1979-1980. Frontline: Plague War: Interviews: Dr. Timothy
Stamps, I (visited Oct. 1, 1999) <http://www.pbs.orglwgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plague/sa/stamps.html>.
58. Frontline: Plague War: What Happened in South Africa?, supra note 56, at 1. See also
Frontline: Plague War: Interviews: Dr. Daan Goosen, supra note 56, at 3. The reported plans to use
biological weapons to target black population would breach international prohibitions of genocide as
"measures intended to prevent births within the group." BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS TODAY 132
(Erhard Geissler ed., 1986), cited in PAUL CHRISTOPHER, supra note 7, at 209-10. See also Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, Art. 2 (d), U.N.T.S. No. 1021.
59. Steinbruner, supra note 8, at 87. It should be noted that the United States and France sold Iraq
anthrax and other biological agents during the 1980s. Zilinskas, supra note 12, at 419. Tighter international
controls on transfers could have prevented these sales.
60. Zilinskas, supra note 12, at 422. Reportedly, Iraq would have used biological weapons had
Baghdad been attacked with nuclear weapons. Gene Warfare-Unless We Keep Our Guard Up, 348 LANCET
1183 (1996) available in LEXIS, Genmed Library, AllJnI File. This position regarding the use of weapons
of mass destruction would not differ from the American position regarding nuclear weapons. See also
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 7, at 97.
61. Frontline: Plague War: Interviews: William S. Cohen, supra note 53, at 3-4. We have always
taken the position that should we be attacked by any power with a nuclear weapon, certainly we have the
capacity to respond accordingly. We have also indicated to any country who would threaten our forces or
our people with chemical or biological weapons that they would be met with a devastating response that
would be quite swift and overwhelming. There is no designation of what that might entail, but it is very clear
that it would be a very destructive force that they would be met with. Id.
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Non-state actors have also used biological warfare in the past and could
present a great challenge for future control of biological weapons. Terrorist
organizations, cults, and hate groups provide the largest risk of non-state use of
biological weapons. For unclear reasons, in 1984, the Rajneeshee cult poisoned
salad bars in Oregon with salmonella in 1984, causing 751 cases of enteritis and
forty-five hospitalizations.62 At the time of its discovery in 1995, the Japanese
cult Aum Shinrikyo developed a biological weapons program including anthrax
and botulism to the testing stage,63 also in 1995, American authorities caught
and convicted two members of a Minnesota militia group planning an attack on
government officials with ricin, a lethal toxin used in assassinations. 64 In 1996,
an Ohio man connected with hate groups was able to obtain samples of the
plague through the mail, by ordering it from a laboratory.61
IV. ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
Legal controls on biological weapons evolved contemporaneously with
modern development of the weapons. Early prohibitions of biological weapons
in war forbid the use of poisons for ethical reasons.6 Modern sources of
62. George W. Christopher, supra note 7, at 416.
63. Kadlec, supra note 1, at 354.
64. Danzig, supra note 6, at 432. See also George W. Christopher, supra note 7, at 416.
65. Id. Frontline interviewed the Ohio man, Larry Wayne Harris, for a program that aired Oct. 13,
1998. In the interview, Harris describes the ease of obtaining plague and anthrax from natural sources.
Frontline: Plague War: Transcript, 4 (visited Oct. 1, 1999) <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontlinel
shows/plague/tc/script.htnl>. Also interviewed was an individual calling himself "Uncle Fester" who
provides recipes for ricin and other biological agents on the Internet. Id. at 3-4.
66. The customary law regarding poison was spelled out in Lieber's Code in 1863. Lieber's Code
was an American army field manual and not an international treaty, but reflected the international rules of
war. "The use of poison in any manner, be it to poison wells, or food, or arms, is wholly excluded from
modem warfare. He who uses it puts himself out of the pale of the law and usages of war." RICHARD SHELLY
HARTIGAN, LIEBER'S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 48, 58 (1983), cited in PAUL CHRISTOPHER, supra note
7, at 205-06. See also Francis Lieber, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the
Field, Art. 16, cited in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS
AND OTHER DocuMENTs 6 (Dietrich Schindler & Ji Toman eds., 1973). "When he fights with his foes in
battle, let him not strike with weapons concealed (in wood), nor with (such as are) barbed, poisoned or the
points of which are blazing with fire." THE LAWS OF MANU (G. Bohler, trans. 1886), reprinted in 25 THE
SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST 230, 251-2 (1975) cited in Chemical and Biological Weapons Historical
Documents: The Manu Smrti (visited Oct. 23, 1999) <http://www.sipri.se/cbw/docs/cbw-hist-manu.html>.
The Manu Smrti is an early code adopted by ancient Aryan tribes in the Indian subcontinent.... and most
of all, they shall not construct any poisoned globes, nor other sorts ofpyrobolic inventions, in which he shall
introduce no poison whatsoever, besides which, they shall never employ them for the ruin and destruction
of men, because the first inventors of our art thought such actions as unjust among themselves as unworthy
of a man of heart and a real soldier. C. SiEMIENOwcz, GRAND ART D'ARTILLERIE 234 (1650) cited in
Chemical and Biological Weapons Historical Documents: Pledge (visited Oct. 23, 1999)
http://www.sipri.se/cbw/docs/cbw-hist-pledge.html>. This was a late medieval pledge by German gunners.
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international law place the obligation not to use biological weapons on the state,
rather than on the individual.6 A shift from ancient codes of moral obligation
to modern notions of reciprocal obligations made the legal standard relative to
the circumstances of war. However, the many instances of crude biological
warfare exemplified a counter-trend of moral relativity in pre-modern times, as
often troops felt justified in using any weapon at their disposal to defeat an
enemy. The British justification and use of smallpox against Native Americans
is an example of this willingness to use any means necessary to defeat an
enemy.68
Modern controls on biological warfare evolved from controls on chemical
warfare. Before the twentieth century, states had not yet developed modern
biological and chemical weapons, and diplomats could only guess the form of
use of such weapons.69 In 1899, delegates to the Hague Conference prepared
Note these three prohibitions set down obligations for soldiers, not merely leaders. The moral duty of soldiers
in warjus in bellum, creates a stronger prohibition of biological warfare.
67. Considering... That this end would be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly
aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevitable; [t]hat the employment of such arms
would therefore be contrary to the laws of humanity; [t]he contracting Parties engage mutually to renounce,
in case of war among themselves, the employment... of any projectile... which is either explosive or
charged with fulminating or inflammable substances .... [t]his engagement is obligatory only upon the
contracting or acceding parties thereto,... it is not applicable with regard to non-contracting powers.... [I]t
will also cease to be obligatory from the moment when, in a war between contracting or acceding parties, a
non-contracting party... shall join one of the belligerents.
68. Declaration ofSt. Petersburg of1868 to the Effect ofProhibiting the Use of Certain Projectiles
in Wartime, Nov. 29, (Dec. 11) 1868, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 95 (Supp. 1907). See also Chemical and Biological
Weapons Historical Documents: St. Petersburg, (visited Oct. 1, 1999) <http./www.sipri.se/cbw/docs/cbw-
hist-petersburg.html>. The obligation contained in this Declaration specifically prohibited the use of
"fulminating" substances, referring to chemical weapons, but the obligation regarding the use of chemical
weapons gives insight into biological weapon control, as both modem chemical and biological weaponry were
in an infant state at this point and can be considered together. Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868. The
Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868 only refers to the obligations states have regarding these weapons, not
of soldiers. Id. While the Preamble reflects an older belief that these weapons are "contrary to the laws of
humanity," the obligation contained in the Declaration only extends to states contracting to the Declaration.
Id. This Declaration gives an early example of the "no first use" principle, which forbids the use of certain
weapons unless another nation uses them first. See PAUL CHRISTOPHER, supra note 7, at 205-08. States are
not absolutely forbidden from using prohibited weapons, and in certain situations may even use them against
other contracting parties to the Declaration. Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868. See also Brussels
Conference of 1874, Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War, Aug.
27, 1874, art. 13(a), cited in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 66, at 29; The Laws of War on
Land, (Oxford Manual) Sep. 9, 1880, arts. 8(a) & 9(a), citedin THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note
66, at 38. See supra note 31.
69. Diplomats and military leaders at the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conferences, vaguely glimpsing
the future of war, defined limits on air power in terms of prohibitions of "discharge of projectiles and
explosives from balloons" and limited naval warfare in a manner only barely discerning the potential of
weapons like the submarine. Hague Declaration (IV) -Projectiles From Balloons, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat.
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a Declaration Concerning Asphyxiating Gas (Hague Declaration (IV) of 1899).
It limited the use of projectiles, "the object of which is the diffusion of
asphyxiating or deleterious gases," but it did not outlaw the use of chemical
agents themselves."0 Diplomats could expand the term "deleterious gases" to
include biological agents, despite lack of specific mention of biological
weapons.7' The Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land of 1907 (Hague Convention (IV) of 1907) expanded on the obligations
from the earlier Hague Declaration (IV) of 1899 by specifically forbidding the
employment of poisoned weapons. 72 However, since this obligation still only
applied to parties to the Convention, states formed no general rule of
international law before World War I.
Following the First World War, a flu epidemic struck the war-weary
world, causing more deaths than the Great War.7a  The great destruction
wrought by disease exemplified the danger of illness, leading statesmen to
include biological weapons specifically by reference in the Protocol for the
Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and
of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (the Geneva Protocol of 1925)."' The
Geneva Protocol of 1925 forbid the use of biological weapons by extending the
prohibition on "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases" to "bacteriological
1839, Hague Convention (VIII) -Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines, Oct. 10,
1907,36 Stat. 2332,2343-44, Art. I-VI. The Declaration concerning asphyxiating gases was similarly vague
on account of the lack of experience with new weapons. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1779, 187 Consol. T.S. 410. Hague Declaration (IV) -
Concerning Asphyxiating Gas, July 29, 1899, 1 AM J. INT'L L. 157 (Supp. 1907). See also CALVIN
DEARMOND DAVIS, THE UNITED STATES AND THE FIRST HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE 119 (1962).
70. Hague Declaration (IV) - Concerning Asphyxiating Gas, supra note 69. Like the Declaration
of St. Petersburg, the Hague Declaration (IV) only applied in cases of war between two parties to the
Declaration, and was not effective ifa non-contracting state was involved in a war. Thus, no absolute ban
on the weapons was created by 1899.
71. A United States delegate to the Hague, Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, opposed controls on
poisonous gas as there was no experience to show whether gas might be more humane than existing weapons.
DAVIS, supra note 69, at 119. Ultimately, the United States did not sign this Declaration. Id. at 196. See
also PAUL CHRISTOPHER supra note 7, at 206. Apparently, Admiral Mahan'thought that asphyxiation by gas
was no more inherently cruel than asphyxiation by water, a fate suffered by sailors in sunken ships. DAVIS,
supra note 69, at 119.
72. Hague Convention (IV) - Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, With Annex of
Regulations, Jan. 26, 1910, Sec. II, Hostilities, art. 23(a), 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539.
73. 8,000,000 soldiers died in the First World War, with approximately 8,000,000 additional
civilian casualties, while 20,000,000 died from the influenza epidemic of 1918. Steinbruner, supra note 8,
at 85.
74. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and
of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925,26 U.S.T. 571, T.I.A.S. No. 8061 [hereinafter Geneva
Protocol of 1925].
methods of warfare."" The Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibited the use of
biological weapons, but did not outlaw their development. This either reflects
a belief that states could not legitimately develop outlawed biological weapons,
or implicitly states a no first-use policy, which allows nations to develop
biological weapons in response to acts of biological war.
The United Kingdom, Soviet Union and France announced reservations to
the Geneva Protocol of 1925, specifically stating a no first-use policy regarding
chemical and biological weapons.76 While these reservations reflected
experience with chemical weapons in the First World War, and the expectation
of the future use of chemical weapons, the reservations also watered down
obligations regarding biological weapons." In addition, two major nations did
not ratify the Protocol--the United States and Japan.7" This also weakened the
Geneva Protocol of 1925, as contracting parties would more likely confront a
major power with far-flung military commitments than a smaller nation unlikely
to intervene in world affairs. However, despite development of biological
weapons, widespread use did not occur during the Second World War, the
significant exception being Japanese use of plague against Chinese villagers.79
The lack of biological warfare, combined with the legal proscription in the
Geneva Protocol of 1925, might have developed a customary principle of
international law. 0 A sufficient number of nations ratified the Protocol to make
observance widespread and the absence of biological warfare in the Second
World War is evidence of opinio juris, showing states believed they were
bound by custom. Thus by the 1960s, widespread evidence of a customary
norm existed.8 However, even if a customary rule existed, the reservations to
75. Id.
76. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and
of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, cited in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note
66, at 116, 119. See also Kadlec, supra note 1, at 352.
77. As over 120 nations signed the Geneva Protocol of 1925, a prohibition on first-use would in
most cases create a general prohibition, unless a contracting party met one of the few nations that failed to
ratify the Protocol. PAUL CHRISTOPHER, supra note 7, at 207.
78. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and
of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, cited in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLIC, supra note
66, at 111-14. See also Kadlec, supra note 1, at 352.
79. See supra note 39.
80. The Preamble to the BWC reaffirms "adherence to the principles and objectives" of the Geneva
Protocol of 1925 and expresses a norm created by the Protocol. Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxins
Weapons Convention, supra note 3, at Preamble. However, Article VIII states "[n]othing in this Convention
shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the
Protocol," implying that any obligation created by the Protocol had to be actively assumed by the contracting
party and did not exist as a rule of law outside such assumption of obligations. Id. at art. VIII.
81. 120 nations ratified the Geneva Protocol of 1925. See supra note 77. I. Brownlie finds a
statement of customary law in a General Assembly Resolution stating "[t]he General Assembly 1. Calls
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the Geneva Protocol of 1925 expressed by several states would constitute
exceptions by these states to the customary rule of law. The reservations of
three major world powers in particular significantly weakened the power of the
custom.
The American decision in 1969 to end development of biological weapons,
and the United States unilateral statement renouncing all use of the weapons,
opened the door to negotiations of a stronger rule of international law. 2
Initially, Russia blocked separate proceedings for biological and chemical
weapons, but eventually agreed to negotiate separate conventions.8 3
Negotiations led to the BWC in 1972, which contained strong prohibitions on.
the development and stockpiling of biological weapons." Unlike the-earlier
Geneva Protocol of 1925, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom,
the three major world powers essential for the success of the Convention,
ratified the BWC. The BWC is currently the primary legal instrument
controlling biological weapons, ratified by 141 nations.8 5
Due to the uncontrollable nature of the weapons and resulting potential for
injury to civilians and neutral states, other sources of international law regulate
the use of biological weapons. International environmental law may also prove
effective in limiting the use of biological weapons.86 In particular, recent
developments in biotechnology, allowing scientists to alter microorganisms
for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol."Question of Chemical and
Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons, G.A. Res. 2603A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 11, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966), cited in I. BROWNLIE, LegalAspects, in CBW: CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE,
supra note 34, at 145-46. It is interesting to note that even at this point the United States still opposed any
international regulation of biological weapons: The United States was one of three nations voting in
opposition to this measure. Question of Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons, G.A. Res.
2603A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 11, U.N. Doc. A16316 (1966), cited in THE LAWS OF
ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 66, at 125-27.
82. Kadlec, supra note 1, at 352. The United States also ratified the Geneva Protocol of 1925 on
January 25, 1975, subject to a reservation allowing retaliatory use of chemical weapons. Geneva Protocol
of 1925, supra note 74.
83. SIPRI, SIPRI: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 1966-1996,49-63 (1996), cited in Continuity and
Change: Chemical and Biological Warfare, History of the SIPRI CBW Project, 5 (visited Oct. 1, 1999)
<http://www.sipri.se/cbw/research/cbw-continuity.html>. Evidently, Russia believed in a military use of
biological weapons after the United States determined they were of no battlefield value, leading Russia to
continue its offensive biological weapons program even after ratification of the BWC. Steinbruner, supra
note 8, at 89.
84. Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention, supra note 3, at art. I.
85. For an updated list of ratifications to the BWC, see Ratifications to the BTWC, (visited Oct. 1,
1999) <http://www.brad.ac.uklacad/sbtwc/keytext/okrats.htm>.
86. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 24, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 1511/26
(vol. 1) (1992), Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
Principle 26, June 16, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev. I at 3, (1973), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 at 2-
65, and Corr. 1 (1972).
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genetically, may create hazards to biodiversity and pose conventional risks to
the environment.8" As the Convention provides channels for resolving conflicts
and allegations of biological weapon use or development, these sources of legal
controls should be considered in the context of the regime established by the
BWC.88 The next section will detail the provisions of the BWC and the proper
application of other international legal standards to. the biological weapons
regime.
V. THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION OF 1972
The BWC regulated the production, development and stockpiling of
biological weapons, but did not specifically regulate the use of these weapons.
Implicitly, nations agreeing notto produce or possess biological weapons would
be unable to use them. The BWC meshed with the Geneva Protocol of 1925,
as the former regulated production of biological weapons but not their use and
the latter prohibited their use but not their development.8 9 The BWC created
a stronger legal standard by virtue of ratification by all five permanent Security
Council members, contrasting the lack of great power adherence to the earlier
legal standard.9° Unlike any prior regulatory system, the regime created by the
BWC explicitly outlawed biological weapons as a class of weapons.9'
The BWC specifically mentions the Geneva Protocol of 1925, reaffirming
the principles previously developed regarding biological weapons.92 In
addition, the BWC placed further control of chemical weapons on the
international agenda by listing effective prohibition of chemical weapons as an
87. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques, Dec. 10, 1976, 1108 U.N.T.S. 151, 31 T.S. 333, T.I.A.S. No. 9614.
"Environmental modification techniques" is defined as "any technique for changing-through deliberate
manipulation of natural processes-the dynamics, composition or structure of the earth, including its biota.
.. " Id. at art. I1. The genetic modification of biological agents may be considered modification of biota. See
also Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818.
88. Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention, supra note 3, at art. V, VI and
VII.
89. However, several nations had declared reservations to the Geneva Protocol allowing retaliatory
use of biological weapons and could slip through the regulations of both treaties. See supra notes 76 and 77.
See also Graham S. Pearson, The Complementary Role of Environmental and Security Biological Control
Regimes in the 21st Century, 278 JAMA 369, 369 (1997).
90. Representatives of 97 nations signed the BWC in 1972, placing the new standard well on its
way to meeting widespread state acceptance necessary for development of customary international law.
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention, supra note 3. However, notably absent from
the list was China, a non-party to the BWC until the 1980s. Id.
91. Kadlec, supra note 1, at 351.
92. Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention, supra note 3, at Preamble, art.
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objective.93 Parties also included provisions in the BWC to allow for
amendments to the Convention and Conference of State Parties to consider
technological changes and to negotiate controls on chemical weapons.'
Clearly, the Parties intended control over biological and chemical weapons to
be an ongoing process, heavily influenced by scientific developments and
requiring an integrated legal framework.
The BWC contains general legal controls, with all the substantive
regulations being contained in the first ten articles of the Convention. 5 Parties
agree not to "develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain"
biological agents for other than peaceful or defensive purposes.' Whereas the
Hague Declaration of 1899 only banned possession of weapons capable of
delivering chemical agents, the BWC banned possession of both the agent and
means of delivery, creating a stronger control.97 States must divert existing
reserves of biological weapons to peaceful purposes or destroy them.9
Article IH of the Convention prohibits the Parties from transferring any
element of biological weapons to any recipient, and Parties must refrain from
encouraging or aiding any state or international organization in developing
biological weapons.9 Additionally, Article IV mandates that Parties prevent
93. Id. at Preamble, art. IX. The inclusion of a chemical weapons agreement in the text of the
BWC, not merely in the preamble, showed an increased desire to negotiate such an agreement, although the
CWC was not completed for another 20 years. Id. at Preamble. Arms control of biological and chemical
weapons are often linked, and it may have been necessary to agree to future discussion on chemical weapons
to get an agreement on biological weapons. The interlinkage of arms control has played a role in the
discussion of other agreements; for instance, Egypt held back approval of the CWC until Israel ratified the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as Israel had developed the capacity to build nuclear weapons, and Egypt
had only chemical weapons to counter the Israeli nuclear weapons. See United Nations, Centre for
Disarmament Affairs, 1996 U.N. DIsARMAMENT Y.B. 87.
94. Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention, supra note 3, at arts. XI and XII.
95. Id. at arts. I-X.
96. Id. at art. I. The article prohibits possession of agents "of types and in quantities that have no
justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes," without specifically listing which agents
or what levels would not be justified. Id. The vagueness in the wording allows arguments to be made
justifying acquisition of biological agents with potential military value. A state attempting to begin an
offensive weapons program would need only show the potential weapon also could be used for peaceful
purposes to counter accusations of non-compliance.
97. Id. at art. I. The Hague Declaration (IV) of 1899 stated: "It]he Contracting Powers agree to
abstain from the use of projectiles the object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases."
Hague Declaration (IV) -Concerning Asphyxiating Gas, supra note 69. In the First World War, Germany
initially attempted to skirt the provisions of the Hague Declaration Concerning Asphyxiating Gas by
providing different means of delivering chemical weapons besides projectiles designed solely for gas,
including opening 5,000 containers filled with chlorine upwind ofenemy troops. PAUL CHRISTOPHER, supra
note 7, at 206-07.
98. Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention, supra note 3, at art. I1.
99. Id. at art. III.
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development of any element of biological weapons within their jurisdiction.' 0
Together, Articles III and IV require national controls to prevent non-state
actors from acquiring the means to carry out biological warfare and prohibits
international development of biological weapons. The BWC promotes non-
proliferation as well as disarmament. However, the Convention stresses
implementation of these measures in a manner to allow economic development
and cooperation in preventing disease.' Parties may exchange scientific
information and equipment for peaceful purposes. 2
In case of an accusation of non-compliance, Parties may lodge a complaint
with the United Nations Security Council, which may then conduct an
investigation.' 3 Parties have the obligation to consult and cooperate in solving
a problem relating to the BWC, including a specific obligation to cooperate in
an investigation undertaken by the Security Council.' After the Security
Council determines a violation of the Convention endangers a Party, all Parties
must either "provide or support assistance" to the endangered Party if
requested. 5 These provisions of the BWC create a basic mechanism for any
needed verification and inspection provisions, as well as sanctions and other
collective action required by circumstances.
The BWC contains elements allowing the evolution of more defined
regulation of biological weapons. The BWC forbids the possession of elements
of biological weapons for other than "prophylactic, protective or other peaceful
purposes," which is sufficiently flexible to permit defensive development of
antibiotics and other biological warfare counter-measures."0 This language is
also broad enough for creating standards defining specific biological agents
with no justification for peaceful purposes. Parties could amend provisions of
the BWC requiring cooperation with any Security Council investigation to
allow stronger verification and inspection standards ensuring compliance with
Convention obligations. Finally, the regular conferences required by the BWC
and the provisions allowing amendment of the Convention would provide
nations with the framework for upgrading existing biological weapons controls.
Given proper motivation of the international community, Parties could streng-
then the provisions of the BWC to further prevent the risk of biological warfare.
100. Id. at art. IV.
101. Id. at art X (1).
102. ld. at art. X (2).
103. Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention, supra note 3, at art. VI.
104. Id. at arts. V and VI. Any permanent member of the Security Council, (the United States,
China, Russia, Great Britain or France) could veto any investigation in accordance with United Nations
provisions. U.N. CHARTER, art. 27, 3. See Kadlec, supra note 1, at 353.
105. Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention, supra note 3, at art. VII.
106. Id. at art. I.
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VI. DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS
Following entry into force of the BWC in 1975, the Parties have held four
review conferences in 1980, 1986, 1991, and 1996."7 After the end of the Cold
War, momentum to strengthen weapons control increased. The Persian Gulf
War of 1991 and attendant risks of biological warfare increased attention on the
need to prevent states from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. At the
review conference in 1991, Parties established an Ad Hoc Group of
Governmental Experts (VEREX) to study verification measures to strengthen
the BWC.0 8 VEREX issued a report analyzing various verification measures
in 1994, and the Parties held a Special Conference to discuss further action.'0 9
The Parties created an Ad Hoc Group to consider binding verification measures
to the BWC." °
The Parties to the BWC held the Fourth Review Conference in November
and December of 1996."' Among the issues considered at the Fourth Review
Conference, the Parties discussed the work of the Ad Hoc Group as well as a
proposal put forward by Iran." 2 The Parties stated that effective verification
measures as discussed by the Ad Hoc Group could reinforce the BWC." 3 At
the Fourth Review Conference, Iran noted the BWC does not explicitly prohibit
the use of biological weapons and proposed an amendment providing a direct
ban on all use of biological weapons." 4
In the Final Declaration, the Parties agreed that use of biological weapons
would violate Article I." The Parties also discussed the ban on use of
biological weapons concerning Articles IV and VIII. 6 As several states retain
107. UNITED NATIONS, CENTRE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, supra note 93, at 70.
108. Id.
109. Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, Final Documents, at 28-29, U.N. Doc. BWC/CONF.IV/9 (1996), [hereinafter Fourth Review
Conference] (visited Oct. 13, 1999) <http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/revconfl4final2.htm>. Alexander
V. Vorobiev, Working on the Compliance Regime for the BWC, CBW CONVENTIONS BULL. Mar. 1998, at
2, (visited Oct. 13, 1999) <httpi/www.fas.harvard.edu/-hsp/>.
110. Vorobiev, supra note 109, at 2.
111. Fourth Review Conference, supra note 109, at 1.
112. Id. atl.
113. Id. at 14.
114. Id. at 11.
115. Id. at 15. The Parties also noted the changes in technology since the Third Review Conference
including advances in microbiology, biotechnology and genetic engineering, and stated that art. I of the BWC
applied to these developments. Id.
116. Id. at l8,22.
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reservations to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 allowing retaliatory use of
biological weapons, the Conference noted that these were "totally incompatible
with the absolute and universal prohibition" of biological weapons and called
for withdrawal of reservations." 7 The Parties considered the direct statement
in the Final Declaration banning all use of biological weapons as signifying the
state of international law, and as an alternative to amending the BWC. "
The delegations also discussed control of non-state possession of
biological weapons at the Fourth Review Conference." 9 The Parties held
Article III of the BWC prevented transfer of agents or weapons to any recipient,
including transnational terrorists and subnational groups like millennial cults. 2°
The Conference also stressed that under Article IV each Party should adopt
penal legislation to apply within the jurisdiction of the state. 2'
Among other issues discussed by the Parties in the Fourth Review
Conference was international environmental law. The Conference noted the
importance of the Rio Declaration and Convention on Biological Diversity to
controls on biological warfare, in particular to implementation of Article X.'
The interlinking of technology transfers, biodiversity and international
development creates an area of overlap that may influence further development
117. Id. at 22-23. See also supra note 76.
118. Some delegations to the Fourth Review Conference stated the ninth paragraph of the Preamble
of the BWC prohibited use. Fourth Review Conference, supra note 109, at 38. This paragraph reads:
"[d]etermined, for the sake ofall mankind, to exclude completely the possibility ofbacteriological (biological)
agents and toxins being used as weapons." Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention,
supra note 3, at Preamble. Other delegations believed amending the BWC would open it to further
amendments, thereby weakening the regime. Fourth Review Conference, supra note 109, at 39. Any
amendment would require ratification by individual states, opening the BWC to the possibility of becoming
a two-tier system in which only some of the states explicitly banned the use of biological weapons. Id.
119. Fourth Review Conference, supra note 109, at 16-18.
120. Id. at 16-17.
121. Id. at 17-18. The Final Declaration stated explicitly that states had an obligation under the
BWC to prevent use of biological weapons in terrorist or criminal activity. Id. at 17. The use of Article IV
to require penal legislation had been questioned previously. Criminalizing BW, CHEMICAL WEAPONS
CONVENTiON BULL. Mar. 1996, at 1, (visited Oct. 13, 1999) <httpJwww.fas.harvard.edu/-hsp>.
International criminal liability for acts of biological warfare or terrorism would return ethical responsibility
to individuals, similar to premodern regulation of the use of poisons. Id. See generally, supra note 66.
122. Fourth Review Conference, supra note 109, at 24-25, 36. The Rio Declaration stated that
"[w]arfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development. States shall therefore respect international
law providing protection for the environment in times of armed conflict and cooperate in its further develop-
ment, as necessary." Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, supra note 86, at Principle 24. The
Convention on Biological Diversity requires states to "facilitate access for.., technologies that.., make
use of genetic resources and do not cause significant damage to the environment." Convention on Biological
Diversity, June 5, 1992, art. 16 (1), 31 I.L.M. 818. These two documents preserve access to biotechnology
while Article X of the BWC similarly guarantees the right to transfer biological agents and technology for
peaceful purposes. Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention, supra note 3, art. X.
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of biological weapons controls. In addition, differences of opinion between
developed and developing nations produced different negotiation positions, the
developing nations desiring freer access to recent medical technology.'23 The
Parties also disagreed on the BWC provision for United Nations Security
Council control over investigations, as the great powers would have a potential
veto over investigations of their own conduct.124
Finally, the Parties discussed enhanced verification mechanisms at the
Fourth Review Conference. The Parties noted that the Ad Hoc Group was
preparing the basic framework for a legally binding mechanism to strengthen
the BWC. 2 1 The Parties also noted the problem of time constraints when
setting a new goal of completion of Ad Hoc Group work by the Fifth Review
Conference of 2001.126
The Ad Hoc Group has held sessions since January 1995 to consider a new
Protocol to strengthen the BWC. 27 Many nations, including the United States,
have placed goals for completion of the Protocol by the end of 1998.128
123. See UNITED NATIONS, CENTRE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, supra note 93, at 79.
124. Id. at 78.
125. Fourth Review Conference, supra note 109, at 29. Arguments had been made that the mandate
of the Ad Hoc Group did not allow a protocol to be the outcome ofdiscussions. Vorobiev, supra note 109.
126. Fourth Review Conference, supra note 109. Problems posed by time constraints have surfaced
numerous times during the negotiation of the BWC Protocol and may offset current deadlines. The Ad Hoc
Group was unable to complete negotiations during 1995, in part due to time constraints, delegates spending
time in negotiations with other international organizations. See UNITED NATIONS, CENTRE FOR
DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, supra note 93, at 72. During early 1996, negotiators were busy preparing the
comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, preventing negotiation on the Protocol to the BWC. Vorobiev, supra
note 109, at 3. In 1998, Parties to the January meeting of the Ad Hoc Group worried about a scheduling clash
between Ad Hoc Group meetings and human rights meetings in March. Graham S. Pearson, Progress at the
Ad Hoc Group in Geneva Quarterly, Review No. 2, at 2, (visited Oct. 13, 1999) <http://www.brad.ac.uk/
acad/sbtwc/prgenevaprgen2.htm>. At the Ad Hoc Group session in June and July 1998, a scheduling
problem with United Nations General Assembly sessions required rearranging meetings to be held in October.
Procedural Report: AdHoc Group 11th Session, at2 U.N. Doc. BWC/AD HOC GROUP/41 (1998), (visited
Nov. 1, 1998) <http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/ahg41/procrp4l.htm>. Any future goal for completion
of the Protocol must be considered highly tentative.
127. Vorobiev, supra note 109.
128. In his 1998 State of the Union Address, President Clinton spoke on the BWC Protocol:
"Last year, the Senate ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention to protect our
soldiers and citizens from poison gas. Now we must act to prevent the use of disease
as a weapon of war and terror. The Biological Weapons Convention has been in effect
for twenty -three years now. The rules are good, but the enforcement is weak. We
must strengthen it with a new international inspection system to detect and deter
cheating ......
President William Clinton, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 1998) in President Clinton
Statements, DISARMAmENT DIPLOMACY, Jan. 1998, (visited Nov. 2, 1998) <http://www.gn.apc.org/
acronym/dd22.htm>. By September, an informal ministerial meeting reflected the realization that the
Currently, the Parties have held four sessions of the Ad Hoc Group in 1998.29
In all likelihood, the Parties should complete a Protocol to the BWC within the
next year. The new Protocol will radically alter the biological weapons control
regime. The new Protocol will aid resolution of situations involving violations
of the BWC, like the ongoing struggle by United Nations inspectors to detect
Iraqi transgressions. Given the horror of biological weapons, the current
international trend will be to ratify the Protocol. 30 States refusing to ratify may
focus attention on their position and be likely targets for heightened
international scrutiny. These non-parties to a Protocol may also find quarantine
placed around them, preventing the sale of dual-use technology necessary for
development of health standards. This will also prove an incentive for states
to ratify the Protocol.
Several essential issues effect negotiations on the Protocol to the BWC.
The standard of verification measures, including declarations and visits involve
aspects of national security, trade secrets and power disparities between strong
and weak nations. Nations are also debating strict or loose definitions of
biological agents, facilities and allowable quantities of agents.
The primary means of verifying compliance with the BWC are
declarations and visits. Parties would declare facilities, agents and activities
effecting the subject of the BWC and would authorize inspection visits,
including random routine visits of declared facilities and challenge visits to
resolve accusations of non-compliance. A "loose" regime of verification
measures would provide ad hoc decision-making, fitted to the circumstances of
each case, while a "strict" regime would require greater political negotiation to
reach agreement on Protocol provisions. In addition, in a "loose" regime,
nations that are more powerful would have greater political influence than
smaller, weaker nations, creating a biased regime disproportionately reflecting
the interests of the large states.' 3'
Protocol would not be completed until 1999 at the earliest. Declaration of the Informal Ministerial Meeting
on the Negotiation Towards Conclusion of the Protocol to Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention,
Sep. 23, 1998, (visited Oct. 19, 1999) <http:l/www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/other/meetingl.htm>. See also
Meeting on BWC Protocol, DISARMAMENT DIPLOMACY Oct. 1998, (visited Nov. 2, 1998)
<http://www.gn.apc.org/acronym/dd30.htm>.
129. See Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (B7WC) Database, AdHoc Group Documents,
(visited Oct. 19, 1999) <http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/adhocgrp/bw-adhocgrp.htn>;ProceduralReport
Ad Hoc Group I 1th Session, supra note 126, at 3.
130. A draft resolution introduced in the United Nations General Assembly calls for the completion
of the protocol and universal adherence to the BWC. Status of the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction, (Draft resolution), Oct. 22, 1998 cited in DISARMAMENT TIMES, (visited Oct. 19, 1999)
<http://www.igc.org/disarm/lc53cnv2.html >.
131. Vorobiev, supra note 109, at3.
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However, creation of a "strict" regime codifying all banned agents,
weapon systems, and maximum allowable agent levels may defeat the purposes
of the Protocol by failing to list all possible agents that exist or may be
discovered in the future. For instance, the United States and the United
Kingdom disagree with Russia over the value of threshold quantities for
biological agents. The Western nations claim maximum levels are deceptive,
as other nations can quickly develop small amounts of biological agents into
large quantities.' "Strict" definitions of agents may not advance the interest
of security and disarmament.
The United States has also raised concerns about the expectations of
security that would arise from completion of the Protocol. A nation could hide
violations by developing dual-use facilities using biological agents for peaceful
purposes as a cover for a weapons program, as Russia did after ratifying the
BWC.'33 However, states can use the issue of verification as a cover for
political issues, as mistrust underlies political differences.'34 In addition, on site
verification would prove a great obstacle for a potential violator to overcome.
For a Party to conduct weapons research at a declared facility, where random
visits may occur, the Party must know what to hide. They also must know that
the risk of personnel engaged in legitimate activities at the facility leaking
information will make dual-use facilities hard to conceal.'35 For a Party to
conceal a weapons program at an undeclared facility would require absolute
secrecy, posing more difficulties than a dual-use facility. 36
In addition to the issue of verification, states with advanced biotechnology
industries worry about the confidentiality of visits and the possibility of leaks
of trade secrets. Parties could misuse routine inspections of declared facilities
to uncover corporate secrets improperly. 37 The Protocol needs safeguards to
132. UNITED NATIONS, CENTRE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, supra note 93, at 73.
133. Douglas J. MacEachin, Routine and Challenge: Two Pillars of Verification, CBW
CONVENTION BULL. Mar. 1998, at 1, (visited Oct. 19, 1999) <http://www.fas.harvard.edu/-hspl>.
134. President Reagan stated the issue as "[trust but verify" when beginning START negotiations
with the former Soviet Union; verification requires trust and simultaneously increases trust, allowing greater
control of arms. FREDERIC S. PEARSON, THE GLOBAL SPREAD OF ARMS: POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 81 (1994). In addition, nations armed with nuclear weapons would retain a
favorable balance of military strength over the covert biological weapon producing state. MacEachin, supra
note 133, at 1.
135. MacEachin, supra note 133, at 2. See also THE PROBLEMS OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
WARFARE at 49-63, (1975) cited in SIPRI, SIPRI: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 1966-1996, supra note 83, at
5. In an experiment conducted by SIPRI to determine the ability of microbiologists to hide an offensive
biological program in a dual-use facility, scientists rated the chances of a team familiar with the facility
uncovering the program: The average response was 50%, with the percentage stated by scientists involved
in the inspection 20% higher than the response by scientists not directly involved. Id.
136. MacEachin, supra note 133, at 2.
137. Id.
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protect sensitive information before it will gain the support of nations with
large biotechnology industries. States with less developed biotechnology
industries fear lower representation on inspection teams and technical support
staff. These states want employment of staff based on geographical
representation of all states, while the need for the highest trained employees
may prevent an equitable distribution. 3
VII. PROTOCOL TO THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
The current rolling text of the BWC Protocol reflects the concerns of the
parties to the BWC. The Protocol has a sufficiently "strict" text to prevent
political manipulation of standards by large powers and enough flexibility to
address evolving circumstances. The Rolling Text of the Protocol currently
contains twenty-three articles, covering 119 pages, as well as 138 pages of
annexes, appendices and attachments providing detailed provisions. This large
text contrasts sharply with the ten pages of articles in the BWC.'39 The
Protocol, as currently drafted, reflects the "strict" approach to verification with
specific lists of agents, weapons, and quantities of agents and inspection
standards. However, the Protocol retains flexibility, as the text has not
definitively determined levels of agents and parties can amend these and add
other agents.
The Protocol includes several general areas. Article- HI provides the
primary verification rules. Article 1II, Parts (A) through (D) covers lists of
agents, toxins, equipment, threshold levels and necessary declarations of these
items and related activities. 4  Article HII, Parts (E) and (F) address visits,
investigations, and procedures for resolving issues arising from activities
138. Graham S. Pearson, Progress at the AdHoc Group in Geneva Quarterly, Review No. 1, at 8-9,
(visited Oct. 19, 1999) <http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/prgeneva/prgenl.htm>.
139. Rolling Text of a .Protocol to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction,
at 7-10 U.N. Doc. BWC/AD HOC GROUP/41 (1998) [hereinafter Protocol], (visited Oct. 19, 1999)
<http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwclahg41/cont41.htm>; Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
Convention, supra note 3.
140. Protocol, supra note 139, at 25-42, art. IUI, Parts (A)-(D). Annex A, section If lists agents to
be declared by the Parties, including viruses like ebola, marburg, and smallpox virus; bacteria including
bacillus anthracis, brucella, tularemia, and yersinia pestis; rickettsiae; fungi; and toxins such as botulinum
toxins, enterotoxin B and ricin. Rolling Test of a Protocol to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, at 117-19, U.N. Doc. BWC/AD HOC GROUP/39 (1998), Annex A, Part I, [hereinafterAnnex],
(visited Oct 19, 1999) <http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/ahg39/art-x.htm>. Factors for inclusion on list
include prior development as biological weapons, high level of contagiousness, high morbidity, infection
through respiratory route and lack of existing countermeasures. Id. at 120.
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related to the BWC.' 4' Article IX establishes an international organization
designed to carry out the diplomatic and technical tasks related to the
Protocol. 42 Article IV protects the security of information obtained in visits
and inspections. 43  Articles V, VI and XII provide procedures for settling
disputes, ensuring compliance and protecting against biological weapons
attacks.' 4
Other articles consider definitions ofterms, the relationship of the Protocol
to international law, exchange of technical information for peaceful purposes,
national implementation of the Protocol and procedural aspects.1 4 Absent from
the current draft of the Protocol is text for Article I, concerned with general
provisions, and Article'VIII, stating confidence-building measures.'
41
The Protocol establishes an international organization. 14' The Organiza-
tion includes three main bodies: the Conference of States Parties, the Executive
Council and the Technical Body. 14  The Conference of States Parties serves
as the primary organ of the organization, the Executive Council makes
decisions regarding compliance matters and the Technical Body conducts the
actual inspections and visits. All Parties to the Protocol are eligible to occupy
any office of the organization, and the organization cannot deprive any Party
of membership. 4
9
The Conference of States Parties consists of representatives of each Party.
This Conference determines the budget for the organization, elects members to
the Executive Council, appoints a Director-General to the Technical Body,
takes measures to ensure compliance with the Protocol and adopts rules of
procedure submitted by the Executive Council.5 ° The Conference of States
141. Protocol, supra note 139, at 43-7 1, art. III (E), (F).
142. Id. at 90, art. IX.
143. Id. at 72, art. IV.
144. Id. at 75, 76, and 107, arts. V, VI, XII.
145. Id. at 16, 79, 105, 106, 108-119, arts. II, VII, X, XI, XIII-XXII.
146. Protocol, supra note 139, at 15, 89, arts. 1, VIII.
147. Id. at 90, art. IX (A) 1. The organization is simply titled the Organization for the Prohibition
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons, [hereinafter the Organization]. Id.
148. Id. at 90, art. IX (A) 4. The exact names have not been determined. The proposed text
contains several alternatives in brackets. The provision in Article IX lists the bodies as "the Conference of
the States Parties, the [Executive] [Consultative] [Council] and the Technical [Secretariat] [Body]." Id. For
ease this paper will refer to them by the simplified names Conference ofStates Parties, the Executive Council,
and the Technical Body.
149. Protocol, supra note 139 at 90, 91, 94, art. IX (A)-(C) 2, 10, 25.
150. Id. at 93-94, art. IX (B) 24. In addition, the Conference of the States Parties appoints
independent experts to a Scientific Advisory Board. The text contains two proposed versions; in one experts
will be selected based on expertise, in the other on the basis of geographic representation of the Parties. Id.
at 94, art. IX (B) 24 (f).
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Parties will meet in regular annual sessions, as well as special sessions when
convened.' Each Party receives one vote, and the Conference of States Parties
makes decisions by a majority of members present for procedural matters and
consensus on substantive issues. If the Conference of States Parties cannot
attain consensus after a special twenty-four hour recess, the Protocol only
requires a vote of two-thirds of the members present.15 2
The Executive Council consists of an undetermined number of members,
serving a term of two years, some elected and some selected by rotation, paying
regard to geographic distribution. I"3 Executive Council members select their
own chair and vote similarly to the Conference of the States Parties. 54 The
members of the Executive Council are responsible to the Organization, not to
member states; thus, the Council will serve a less political role than the
Conference of States Parties.'55 The Executive Council supervises the
Technical Body; coordinates cooperation, consultation, and clarification among
the Parties; addresses non-compliance by Parties; determines requests for visits;
conducts relations with the Parties; and submits operational manuals to the
Conference of States Parties for approval.'56 The Executive Council may also
bring issues to the attention of the United Nations Security Council for further
action.15
7
The Technical Body includes a Director-General and other scientific,
technical and administrative personnel required by the body. 5 The Technical
Body will carry out verification measures as well as other functions assigned
by the other bodies of the Organization. 59 These tasks include processing
151. Protocol, supra note 139, at 91, art. IX (B) 12, 13.
152. Id. at 92, art. IX (B) 9918-20.
153. Id. at 94, art. IX (C) 25. Proposed text might also include importance of biotechnology
industry and political and security interests as factors for determining members. Id. Members shall be
distributed among five geographic regions: Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and Western Europe
and other states. Id. at 94-95, art. IX (C) 25-26. Distribution on this basis will equitably represent the
nations of the world as a whole but may not adequately represent states with developed biotechnology
industries, as many of these nations are concentrated in Western Europe and the "Other States" region. A
bracketed proposal would restore balance by making the significance of the national biotechnology industry
a factor in determining members from each region. In this proposal, one-third of the seats of each region will
be occupied by the states with the largest biotechnology industries. Protocol, supra note 139, at 96, art. IX
(C) 28. These states could enjoy a similar status as permanent Security Council members, reflecting the
position of the largest states.
154. Id. at 97, art. IX (C) 32-35.
155. Id. at97, art. IX (C) 36.
156. Protocol, supra note 139, at 97-98, art. IX (C) 37.
157. Id. at 99, art. IX (C) 39bis (a).
158. Id. at 102, art. IX (D) 947.
159. Id. at 99, art. IX (D) 40.
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declarations by Parties, analyzing data on disease outbreaks, developing
operation manuals and assisting in visits. 6" Like the Executive Council, the
Technical Body is responsible to the Organization, not the Parties, allowing
greater neutrality in visits and verification tasks.' 6'
Under the verification regime, Parties must declare various facilities,
agents, and work conducted on biological agents to the Organization to promote
full knowledge of state activities and ensure compliance. Parties must declare
agents, equipment, and threshold levels of agents to the Organization upon
ratifying the Protocol, and yearly following the initial declaration. 62 In
addition, Parties must declare all past offensive or defensive programs after
ratifying the Protocol and declare all present defensive programs yearly,
including the results of research. 63 Parties must declare certain other facilities
yearly, including vaccine production facilities, maximum biological
containment laboratories, and high biological containment facilities.'" The
Protocol even requires Parties to declare non-vaccine facilities engaged in
producing medicines or chemicals having the capacity to grow agents above a
specified rate. 6  Thus, any facility capable of rapidly developing biological
agents must be declared.
In addition, Parties must declare various actions that could develop
biological weapons capability or assist in proliferation of biological weapons.
Parties must declare certain work with listed agents, including the capacity for
handling large quantities of agents, any work with certain highly dangerous
agents, application of genetic modification, or aerobiology. 66 Parties must
make yearly declarations of international transfers of listed agents. 6 Parties
must also declare suspicious disease outbreaks even if they are only similar to
diseases caused by listed agents but are undiagnosed. 168
160. Id. at 99-101, art. IX (D) 41-42.
161. Protocol, supra note 139, at 103, art, IX (D) 50-51.
162. Id. at 25-28, art. II (A) 1, (B) 1, (C) IN1-4, & (D) i-2.
163. Id. at 28-30, art. [] (D), Subparts (A) & (B) 3, 4, 7, 8.
164. Id. at 30-35, art. III (D), Subparts (C)-(E) 9, 12.
165. Id. at 39-41, art. m (D), Subpart (G) M15-16.
166. Protocol, supra note 139, at 36-39, art. Ill (D), Subpart (F) 13-14. "Work with listed
[biological] agents and toxins" includes "research, development, production and diagnosis using listed
[biological] agents ... including the study of properties of biological agents ... detection and identification
methods, genetic modification, aerobiology, prophylaxis, treatment methods and maintenance of[registered]
culture collections." Id. at 36, art. [I (D), Subpart (F), n. 23. Aerobiology is defined as "[t]he study of
aerosols comprising particles of biological origin." Id. at 37, art. III (D), Subpart (F), n. 25.
167. Id. at 4 1, art. 111 (D), Subpart (H) 18. This would prevent future sales ofagents similar to sales
by the United States and France to Iraq in the 1980s. See supra note 59.
168. Protocol, supra note 139, at 41, art. IM (D), Subpart (I) 20. This could not only help identify
acts of biological warfare but also allow detection of leaks from declared or undeclared facilities like the
Exceptions do apply to declarations, including exceptions for vaccine fac-
ilities devoted solely to animal consumption on premises; non-vaccine facilities
devoted solely to waste treatment or manufacture of soaps; and fertilizer or food
products facilities working with listed agents for the purpose of diagnosis of
disease or hygiene testing.'69 These exceptions do not provide significant.
loopholes for hiding offensive biological weapons programs. The Protocol still
requires declarations of high containment and maximum containment facilities.
Any lower level facility would pose risks to the local environment if
development of weapons occurred, allowing attention to be focused on them.
In addition to other declarations, states must submit titles of national legislation
regulating access to pathogen storage buildings and access to areas in which an
outbreak of infectious disease occurs. 7° These declarations set legal ground
work for any needed visits and allow effective verification.
The Protocol sets out four types of visits, including random, clarification,
request, and voluntary. '' A set number of randomly selected visits to declared
sites will occur each year distributed evenly among the five geographic groups
of states. 72 Parties will have only a limited number of hours' notice before the
visit, discouraging attempts at hiding non-compliance.' Clarification visits
will remove ambiguity in declarations of Parties and promote thoroughness and
honesty in declarations.'74 In addition, a state may request a voluntary visit to
build confidence in the regime or to resolve any concern related to biological
weapons.'
The Protocol specifies that inspection teams will carry out all visits in the
least intrusive manner. 76 In addition, Article IV of the Protocol specifically
requires the organization to take every precaution to protect the confidentiality
of information gathered in visits." Within limited privileges and immunities,
Parties can hold employees of the organization civilly liable for harm caused by
unauthorized disclosure of confidential information.'78 These provisions allow
Russian anthrax leak of 1979, preventing violations of BWC obligations.
169. Id. at 31-32, 38-39, 40, art. III (D), Subparts (C), (F), (G) 10, 14, 16.
170. Id. at 42, art. I1 (D), Subpart (K) 24.
171. Id. at 46, art. III (F) 11.
172. Id. at 46-47, art. Ill (F), Subpart (A) 2, 4.
173. Protocol, supra note 139, at 47, art. IllI (F), Subpart (A) 7.
174. Id. at 47-48, art. III (F), Subpart (B) 8.
175. Id. at 49, 50, art. Ill (F), Subparts (C), (D) 18, 23.
176. Id. at 47, 49, 50, art. I1 (F), Subparts (A)-(C) 3, 9, 22, 31.
177. Id. at 72, art. IV 71.
178. Protocol, supra note 139, at 73, art. IV 6. The Organization shall maintain the privileges and
immunities necessary for the exercise of its functions, but agreements between the individual Parties and the
Organization shall define the extent of these privileges and immunities. Id. at 103-104, art. IX (E) 753-57.
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a strong verification regime to exist without compromising the security required
for business interests. These measures can achieve greater compliance, as fear
of damage to biotechnology industries will not dissuade Parties from ratifying
the Protocol.
In addition to the visits authorized under the Protocol, provisions
specifically address investigations of non-compliance concerns. Parties may
request field investigations for alleged use of biological weapons or facility
investigations for other breaches of the BWC.'79 A Party may request
investigation regardless of the ownership of the facility, allowing investigation
of private companies as well as non-state actors. 80 Parties can request a non-
compliance inspection for conduct involving a non-party to either the Protocol
or the BWC, although in the latter case, the Organization shall cooperate with
the United Nations Secretary General.' To request an investigation, a State
Party must first attempt to resolve the issue through direct consultation and
cooperation; if this does not resolve the conflict, the Party must provide
information substantiating a claim of non-compliance." 2
The Director-General determines that if the request for investigation has
met the requirements to proceed further, the Executive Council will vote to
initiate action. ' Ifthe Executive Council decides to begin an investigation, the
Director-General shall issue a mandate to an investigation team for the conduct
of the investigation.' The Party being investigated shall provide access to
determine non-compliance, subject to its constitutional limitations regarding
proprietary rights and searches and seizures. 5 The investigated Party shall
have the right to limit access to sensitive areas unrelated to the investigation.
8 6
179. Id. at 56, art. III (F), Subpart (A) "4. In addition, language has been proposed to allow
investigations of transfers of biological agents or weapons. Id.
180. Id. at 57, art. I[ (F), Subpart (A) 6.
181. Protocol, supra note 139, at 57, art. m] (F), Subpart (A) 7-9. Proposed language would also
require cooperation with the United Nations Security Council, reflecting tension between large and small
states over the proper body to address non-compliance concerns. Id.
182. Id. at 58, art. III (F), Subpart (C) 1 1, 13. States should include any information on the non-
complying Party, circumstances surrounding the alleged event, location of any relevant facilities and evidence
of an outbreak of disease. Id. at 59-61, art. III (F), Subpart (C) t16-19.
183. Protocol, supra note 139, at 62-63, art III (F), Subpart (E) 21-26. The Protocol has two
proposals for voting, one of which requires either a two-thirds or three-fourths majority vote to begin an
investigation, the other requiring a three-fourths majority vote to halt an investigation. Id. at 63, art. [] (F),
Subpart (E) 26. The former type is known as a "green light" procedure, the latter as a "red light" procedure.
Pearson, supra note 138, at 5. The ultimate type of voting procedure adopted in the Protocol will have a
major impact on completion of investigations.
184. Protocol, supra note 139, at 63, art. [] (F), Subpart (F) 29.
185. Id. at 64, art. III (F), Subpart (G) 32.
186. Id. at 64, 65, art. III (F), Subpart (G) 34, 35. However, proposed language concerning
investigation of biological weapon use would require an investigated Party to allow members of an
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The investigation team will issue a Final Report, which the Executive Council
shall consider when deciding whether non-compliance has occurred.187
If the Executive Council determines that non-compliance has occurred, it
shall "take measures to redress the situation and to ensure compliance"
including recommending action to the Conference of States Parties.'88 The
Conference of States Parties shall take measures to redress the situation,
including restricting or suspending the non-complying Party's rights under the
Protocol, recommending collective measures to other Parties or bringing the
matter to the attention of the United Nations General Assembly or Security
Council."8 9 A Party subject to attack by biological weapons or threatened by
acts of non-compliance may request assistance from the other Parties, who must
provide assistance."9°
Several aspects of the Protocol to the BWC are noteworthy. First, the
Protocol would provide rapid response to any threat of biological warfare. The
various bodies of the Organization must respond to requests for investigation
within hours of receiving them.'9' In addition, the Protocol reflects
investigation team access to the restricted site if an investigation mandate could not be carried out otherwise.
Id. at 68, art. III (F), Subpart (G) 155. An investigated Party can also take measures to protect sensitive
facilities being investigated for other breaches of the BWC, including limiting inspection through the use of
random selection of buildings to be inspected or shrouding of sensitive pieces of equipment. Id. at 68-69,
art. III (F), Subpart (G) 57. Access may be limited by the investigated state, but the investigated Party has
the obligation to demonstrate that the areas of limited access were not related to non-compliance concerns.
Protocol, supra note 139, at 69, art. m (F), Subpart (G) 58.
187. Id. at 69, 70, art. III (F), Subparts (H), (J) 60, 62-63. The Executive Council also may
determine if the request for investigation had been abused, and may consider further action under applicable
international law, including sanctions, if it is determined the process was abused. Id. at 70-71, art. III (F),
Subpart (J) 163-64, 66. While the investigated State Party and the requesting State Party may participate
in the review process, they shall have no vote. Id. at 71, art. Il (F), Subpart (J) 67.
188. Id. at 71, art. III (F), Subpart (J) 67.
189. Protocol, supra note 139, at 75, art. V IN1-4.
190. Id. at 77-78, art. VI 7-10. "Assistance" includes "coordination and delivery.., of protection
against biological and toxin weapons." Id. at 76, art. VI 1.
191. The Director General must acknowledge receipt of a request to investigate within two hours,
communicate the request to the Party to be investigated within six hours and communicate to all other Parties
within twenty-four hours. Id. at 62, art. IlI (F), Subpart (E) 21. The Executive Council must decide on
whether to conduct an investigation within twelve hours of receipt, and if an investigation is decided upon,
the Party being investigated must provide access within an unspecified number of hours after receiving the
request. Id. at 62, 65, art. III (F), Subparts (E), (G) 25, 38. There is no time limit for the Executive Council
to adopt a decision, but it must review the Final Report of the investigation team "as soon as it is presented."
Protocol, supra note 139, at 70, art. IMl (F), Subpart (J) 63. If a Party requests assistance after the use of
biological weapons, the Director-General shall forward the request to the other Parties within twelve hours,
and shall begin an examination of the request within twenty-four hours to determine what further action by
the Organization is needed, delivering a report on further action to the Executive Council within seventy-two
hours. Id. at 77, art. VI 8, 9. The Executive Council must meet to review the report within twenty-four
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international politics, particularly reflecting desires of large and poor nations
differently than the CWC.' 9 Many features of the Protocol require greater
representation of developing nations than other treaties. Finally, the Protocol
recognizes other sources of international regulation, including international
environmental law, and accepts goals beyond non-proliferation and
disarmament, including development.'93
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Parties may complete the current rolling text to the BWC Protocol
within the next year. A move from a "loose" regime under the BWC to a
"strict" regime will be the likely result of the new Protocol. A new
international regime shall create disincentives to continue covert biological
weapons programs. Non-complying states would likely find themselves
quarantined from the rest of the international community, preventing the flow
of needed technology and scientific information. The regime will use the
United Nations Security Council to prevent states and non-state actors from
building effective weapons programs.
Concerns about a strengthened verification regime should not prevent the
United States from ratifying the Protocol. America's healthy biotechnology
industry would receive greater protection under the Protocol than under the
current BWC. In addition, the United States would gain greater security
through tougher compliance verification. Other states would have greater
representation in the organization established by the Protocol than they would
under the current regime, which places much of the decision making power
with the United Nations Security Council. Provisions reaffirming the necessity
of technology transfers will prevent the Protocol from interrupting the growth
of developing states. The Protocol must retain flexibility to adapt to changes
in the biotechnology field as they occur. In that respect, the Protocol lists of
biological agents and weapons must be capable of quick amendment. Overall,
hours and determine, by simple majority, on taking further action within twenty-four hours of receiving the
report. Id. at 78, art. VI 10. The vote by simple majority further simplifies the process, allowing decisions
to be reached with greater ease and preventing politics from hampering a response.
192. Cf. Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 5, art. VIII (D) 45 with Protocol, supra note
139, at 102, art. IX (D) 148, requiring geographic distribution of the technical staff to be a factor in hiring.
In many respects, the Protocol mirrors the Chemical Weapons Convention. See also Pearson, supra note 138,
at 8-9.
193. Article VII states the Protocol will not be used to impede trade and development, and Parties
must endeavor to promote the peaceful advancement of science internationally. Protocol, supra note 139,
at 80-81, 83, art. VIII (B), (C) 3, 6. The Organization shall maintain a relationship with agencies engaged
in implementing Agenda 21 and the Convention on Biological Diversity, including sharing information on
biological agents, genetically modified organisms, and biosafety practices. Id. at 86, art. VIII (E) 11. See
also Agenda 21, June 13, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/26 (1992).
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the prospects for biological weapons control will improve greatly with the
completion of the new Protocol while addressing a variety of other state
interests, including development and protection of property rights.
There are other reasons to favor international regulation of biological
weapons as a first line of defense. Some commentators believe large countries
need not fear verification as they have nuclear weapons to deter attackers,
while, the smallest and weakest countries have little to lose, as verification will
not change their strategic position. Only the medium states would see potential
diminution of their position."9 However, there are distinctions between nuclear
weapons and biological weapons that reduce the value of nuclear deterrence.
Deterrence is effective when it assures an opposing state an attack will result
in retaliation. A state can detect a nuclear attack before detonation of any
weapons; in addition, the attacker, the time of attack, and the potential targets
can be determined very quickly allowing immediate response. With a
biological weapon attack, the exact time of attack and target can be determined
only by investigating backward following an outbreak of disease. Unless an
attacker admits launching an attack, the victim and international community
must determine the identity of the aggressor. In the midst of a major epidemic,
preservation of forensic evidence might not be a high priority for medical
responders.' 95 Faced with the uncertainty of a response, a potential attacker
might not be deterred. Any retaliation using nuclear weapons would probably
occur months after the initial biological weapon attack, as the victim would
need to build a case against the aggressor to justify massive retaliation. An
immediate, unreasoned response would risk international condemnation if a
state could not present convincing evidence. Thus, nuclear deterrence probably
cannot adequately prevent biological warfare.
The issue of proof arises with spurious claims of biological warfare
alleged for propaganda value. Throughout the Cold War, the United States and
Soviet Union accused one another of biological weapons use, although neither
state gathered sufficient evidence to prove or disprove allegations." The
verification regime created by the Protocol could provide objective proof,
discouraging biased investigations and false claims while determining actual
194. SIPRI: COrrNUTY AND CHANGE 1966-1996, supra note 83, at 6.
195. George W. Christopher, supra note 7, at 416; Harry C. Holloway, The Threat of Biological
Weapons: Prophylaxis and Mitigation of Psychological and Social Consequences, 278 JAMA 425, 425
(1997). See also Jonathan B. Tucker, National Health and Medical Services Response to Incidents of
Chemical and Biological Terrorism, 278 JAMA 362,364-65 (1997).
196. George W. Christopher, supra note7, at415. For instance, the United States accused the Soviet
armed forces of using "yellow rain," an aerosolized form of a biological agent, in Laos, Cambodia, and
Afghanistan, but could not prove allegations because of the inability to investigate adequately in remote
regions; ultimately the natural occurrence of bee feces was found to be a more likely cause of the "yellow
rain." Id.
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uses of weapons.'" Furthermore, the verification body established by the
Protocol could employ former Soviet researchers; utilizing scientists
experienced in biological weapons programs while preventing these
impoverished scientists from selling their skills to the highest bidder.'98
Finally, the political will to control biological weapons exceeds the desire
to control other weapons of mass destruction. International custom forbids the
use of biological weapons in war, while the status of nuclear weapons remains
unclear.' 99 Nations retain large nuclear arsenals and the political value of
attaining nuclear power status remains. The nuclear weapons tests exchanged
between India and Pakistan in the spring of 1998 highlight the attractiveness of
nuclear power status to some states.2" Biological weapons lack the prestige
value of nuclear weapons; biological weapons have no image comparable to a
nuclear test for populations to consider. No commensurate domestic political
gains would result from a nation admitting to perfecting a biological arsenal.
Given the limited utility of biological weapons for battlefield use, biological
weapons would not be worth the international condemnation that would follow
discovery of a biological weapons program. The only major use of biological
weapons would be as weapons of terror and mass destruction. Because of the
peculiar status of biological weapons and the lack of political or military
incentive to acquire them, most nations would be more likely to accept
international regulation.
197. Id. at414-15. North Korea and China accused the United States of using biological weapons
during the Korean War, but would not allow investigation by neutral organizations such as the Red Cross or
World Health Organization; when the United States introduced a resolution in the U.N. requesting an
investigation, the Soviet Union vetoed it, preventing the United States from clearing itself and resulting in
a loss of good will. Id.
198. While many Russian scientists are uncomfortable with significant career changes, particularly
those scientists who have devoted their lives to research, creative attempts have been made to convert
facilities to peaceful technologies, including the transformation of a research facility in Obelisk to a brewery.
Anne M. Harrington, Redirecting Biological Weapons Expertise: Realities and Opportunities in the Former
Soviet Union, 29 CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BULL. Sept. 1995, at 3-4, (visited Oct. 19, 1999)
<http://www.fas.harvard.edu/-hsp/>. Private investment may be insufficient to convert the former Soviet
program since many Western companies will not invest in old Russian facilities with poor safety standards.
Id. at 4. There is historic precedent for employing biological weapons scientists; upon being offered a
biological weapon by an Italian chemist, Louis IV of France gave him a pension on the condition he never
reveal his discovery. PAUL CHRISTOPHER, supra note 7, at 205.
199. See, generally Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 7.
200. Like the dreadnought battleship that created rivalry among European and Latin American
powers early in the century, prestige weapons like nuclear bombs often serve little security purpose. India
and Pakistan evidently felt the domestic political benefits of the tests outweighed the international
repercussions in the form of economic sanctions. Often the drive to acquire nuclear weapons is based on
these domestic political factors, not actual security interests: For instance, some claim French nuclear policy
only serves the purpose of preserving the French seat on the United Nation Security Council rather than any
real security interest. George Perkovich, Nuclear Proliferation, FOREIGN POL'Y, Fall 1998, at 12, 16.
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These circumstances should help momentum continue on strengthening
international regulation of biological weapons. The Parties should complete the
Protocol within the next few years, and if they carefully tailor verification
measures to promote compliance while protecting privately owned technology,
the new regime should enjoy widespread support. If the provisions of the
Protocol include protections of valid national interests, states will register few
objections to the Protocol. The unique international factors surrounding
biological weapons control will allow nations to support greater international
control.
